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Abstract 
 
This study analyzes the effect of fiscal decentralization on health outcomes in China using a panel 
data set with nationwide county-level data. We find that counties in more fiscal decentralized 
provinces have lower infant mortality rates compared to those counties in which the provincial 
government retains the main spending authority, if certain conditions are met. Spending 
responsibilities at the local level need to be matched with county government’s own fiscal capacity. 
For those local governments that have only limited revenues, their ability to spend on local public 
goods such as health care depends crucially upon intergovernmental transfers. The findings of this 
study thereby support the common assertion that fiscal decentralization can indeed lead to more 
efficient production of local public goods, but also highlights the necessary conditions to make this 
happen. 
                                                  
∗ We would like to thank Xiaobo Zhang (IFPRI) and Margit Molnar (OECD) for their valuable 
comments on earlier versions of the paper. We also benefited from comments made during 
presentations of the paper at the ADB Institute (Tokyo) as well as the annual meeting of the German 
Development Economist Association.  
§ Institute of Developing Economies, IDE-JETRO, Japan 
† OECD Development Centre, France 
 2
1.  Introduction 
 
Fiscal decentralization has become a major trend worldwide. The literature highlights the 
allocative benefits of transferring authority and resources from central to local tiers of government 
for the provision of local public goods (Dethier, 1999; Bardhan, 2002). In particular, in developing 
countries where considerable attention is given to the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), hope exists that fiscal decentralization can improve access to health care and other 
social services. How? In a nutshell, two main arguments are discussed in the theoretical literature: 
First, local governments have an information advantage vis-à-vis the central government that allows 
them to provide public goods more efficiently (Hayek, 1945). Second, citizens can “vote with their 
feet”. They will select a local jurisdiction that best balances their aspiration for local public goods 
and the tax level that goes with it. Over time, competition for citizens between the different local 
jurisdictions will drive down costs for the production of local public goods and services (Tiebout, 
1956). Drawing on these experiences, Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) developed a theory of 
fiscal federalism that provides guidelines for the assignment of taxes and expenditures to the various 
levels of government to improve overall welfare. 
China is a very interesting case study to test whether fiscal decentralization indeed leads to 
improved production of local public goods and services. China, with its large size and population, is 
one of the most decentralized countries in the world measured in terms of spending authority 
assigned to the local governments. The health sector is a particularly interesting sector for assessing 
the impact of fiscal decentralization on public goods. It has been undergoing reform for roughly 30 
years, with considerable changes in the provision and financing of health care services. What makes 
the Chinese experience somewhat unique worldwide is its depth of fiscal decentralization in terms of 
expenditure, in contrast with the revenue side that has been recentralized since a major reform in 
1994. Moreover, and contrary to other experiences in developing countries, there has been no 
political decentralization yet: local government officials are not accountable to the local electorate 
but to higher level government officials. In a nutshell, Chinese-style fiscal federalism deviates 
considerably from the textbook case and thereby may yield quite different results. 
Most studies on the impact of fiscal decentralization in China have used province level 
data (e.g. Jin, Qian and Weingast, 2005; Tochkov, 2006). Among these, several studies pointed to 
increasing spending inequalities among Chinese provinces that translate into widening spatial 
inequalities in access to health care (OECD, 2006; Kanbur and Zhang, 2003). Jin and Zou (2005) 
examined the fiscal relationship between central and provincial governments in China. They used the 
relative importance of the provincial government on the revenue side and the expenditure side as 
fiscal decentralization indicators, and analyzed the impacts of fiscal decentralization on economic 
growth. In addition, Zhang (2006) analyzed the influence of fiscal decentralization on regional 
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growth as well as inequality in China. He focused on fiscal decentralization below the province level 
by using county-level fiscal data. 
In this paper, we employ panel data analysis using county-level data to estimate the impact 
of fiscal decentralization on health outcomes. In particular, this allows us to address the development 
within provinces. Counties as intermediaries between central/province and townships are highly 
important to health care provision and thereby influence health outcomes. Two key questions guide 
our analysis. First, do more decentralized county governments perform better, measured in terms of 
lower infant mortality rates, compared with those counties in which provinces play larger roles in the 
provision of public services? Second, what role do intergovernmental transfers play in explaining 
different health outcomes? Fiscal transfers, including several kinds of subsidies, from the central to 
local governments play an increasingly important role in China to deal with the raising inequality 
between and within provinces.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next section provides a short 
theoretical snapshot of fiscal decentralization and health outcomes with reference to the Chinese 
context. Section 3 presents the data used and descriptive statistics, while section 4 presents the 
results of the empirical analysis. The last section presents preliminary policy implications and the 
conclusion. 
 
2.  A simple framework: Fiscal decentralization and health 
 
The administrative structure of the health sector in China is presented in a stylized way in 
Figure 1. The vertical line of ‘Government’ represents the alignment from the central government to 
lower tiers of government. The same vertical alignment is applied to health sector administrations. 
The horizontal line shows the linkage between the government and health administrative 
organizations at each level of government: central, province and county. 
This structure also reflects the direction of flows in the system. Public funds for health 
flow from the upper tiers to the lower tiers of government, and from the upper tiers to the lower tiers 
of the health administration (vertical arrow). In addition, public funds for health flow from the 
government to health organizations at each level of government (horizontal arrow).  
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Figure 1 The Administrative and Fiscal Structure of the Health Sector 
 
Government           Health Administration         (Disease Control and Prevention) 
 
Central               Ministry of Health                 (China CDC1) 
 
Province              Provincial Health Bureau           (Provincial CDC) 
[Prefecture (Diqu)] 
County               County Health Bureau              (County CDC) 
[Township] 
Note: Authors’ compilation. 
 
The central and provincial governments are responsible for the broader policy and strategic 
design, and investment in the larger health infrastructure, whereas the counties have practical 
responsibilities for implementing health programs or services. There are more than one hundred 
counties in large provinces such as Hebei and Sichuan. The fiscal or institutional capacity of the 
county government is critically important for the provision of appropriate health services, and 
ultimately for achieving better health outcomes of the local people. 
Figure 2 presents a simple framework that links fiscal decentralization to health outcomes. 
Following the conventional thinking on fiscal decentralization and its relationship to the provision of 
a local public good, the following stylized chain of interaction can be established. Fiscal 
decentralization assigns more financial responsibility for health service provision to lower tiers of 
government—in the Chinese case, to the county level. This will bring about responsive service 
provision because lower tiers of government can more efficiently provide health care services as 
they know better the preferences of their citizens. Local government with a “helping hand” (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1998) will further invest in and develop the health system, which will lead in the 
medium to long run—in conjunction with other measures such as improved education—to improved 
health outcomes.  
 
                                                  
1 China CDC is formally the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, which was created in 
2002 (Peng et al., 2003). 
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Figure 2 The Linkage between Fiscal Decentralization and Health 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Several caveats exist with this line of argumentation. First, an implicit assumption in the 
standard approach to fiscal federalism is that local governments are responsive to the needs of voters. 
However, in China, local government officials are generally not elected and hence may not be 
responsive to local needs and preferences. Local government officials might be more interested in 
supporting local business development than in investing in the provision of social services, in 
particular, low cost primary health care. In fact, local governments might play the role of a “grabbing 
hand” by investing more in the provision of more expansive tertiary health care such as hospitals 
instead of in the further development of primary health care. Second, the provision of health care 
services with interjurisdictional spillover effects such as immunization might suffer in a 
decentralized setting as local governments have less incentive to provide such services. Third, 
designing a functioning intergovernmental fiscal transfer system that compensates for different 
revenue capacities is a challenge. Conditional transfer will reduce the expenditure management 
(decision-making) autonomy of the local government, which would weaken the responsiveness of 
public services provided by the local government. In contrast, unconditional transfer would reduce 
the incentives for the local government to manage funds efficiently (de Mello, 2000). 
Hence, it is an empirical question whether fiscal decentralization leads to an improvement 
in health outcomes and whether fiscal transfers can play a smoothing role.  
 
 
Fiscal Decentralization: 
Intergovernmental responsibility alignment 
 
 
through changes in health system outputs 
                                                              Other factors: 
                                                        Education/economic level, etc. 
 
                                 Lead to better 
                                Health Outcomes: 
                             Infant mortality rate, etc. 
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3.  Modeling the impact of fiscal decentralization on health outcomes: basic model, data and 
descriptive statistics  
 
3.1 Basic model2 
 
To empirically assess the question of whether and under which conditions fiscal federalism, 
Chinese style, improves health outcomes, we apply a fixed-effects model with the following 
structure to our panel dataset:  
 
The basic model is:  
itititit vCy +++= γα βX  (1), 
 
where i indexes the province and t is time. X denotes fiscal decentralization indicators and C denotes 
the control variables. y is the provincial infant mortality rate and v is an error term. The following 
variables are used in the empirical analysis. 
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in our model is “health outcomes” measured by provincial infant 
mortality rates per thousand live births (IMR). 
 
Explanatory variables 
1) Fiscal decentralization indices 
To quantitatively examine fiscal decentralization below the province level, we use the 
following two indicators: vertical balance (VB) and the ratio of county expenditure to total provincial 
expenditure (RCE). The two indicators are defined as follows: 
 
Vertical balance (VB): 
∑
∑=
i
ji
i j
i
j COR
CE
VB
,
,  (2), 
where j denotes province and i denotes county. CEi,j is county expenditure and CORi,j is the county’s 
own revenue at province (j). Hence, the numerator is counties’ expenditures aggregated at the 
provincial level, and the denominator is counties’ own revenues aggregated at the provincial level. 
Accordingly, VBj is the ratio of aggregate counties’ expenditures to aggregate counties’ own revenues 
in a given province (j). 
                                                  
2 Descriptions of variables are summarized in Table A1in the Appendix.  
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If VBj is greater than one, aggregate county expenditure exceeds aggregate county own 
revenue in province (j). This indicates a fiscal gap in the counties that has to be filled with 
intergovernmental transfers, including various kinds of subsidies.3 On the other hand, if the VB is 
less than one, the revenues at the county level are sufficient to pay for the assigned expenditures. 
Hence, the vertical balance is a good indicator of whether the expenditure assignments of the 
counties in a province need transfers from the provincial or central government. 
 
Ratio of county expenditure to total provincial expenditure (RCE): 
j
i
ji
j TPE
CE
RCE
∑= ,  (3),  
where TPEj denotes total provincial expenditure, which includes aggregate CE i,j in province (j) and 
the expenditure of the provincial government (j).4 Thus, RCE j is always less than unity. It measures 
the ratio of aggregate counties’ expenditure in province (j) to the total fiscal expenditure of province 
(j), and captures the relative importance of counties as public service providers. This indicator is 
important in capturing the extent of fiscal decentralization below the province level. As observed 
below, this ratio varies across provinces in China, which means that fiscal expenditure is more 
decentralized to the county level in some provinces than in others. 
 
2) Socioeconomic characteristics 
Social characteristics are measured by education level and fertility rate at the province 
level. The provincial illiteracy rate (aged 15 and over) is the percentage ratio of the number of 
illiterates to the total population aged 15 and over, which is used in our model as a proxy of the 
education level. The fertility rate is measured by the provincial birth rate, which is the ratio of the 
number of births to the average population in the province (times 1000 (%)). 
Economic characteristics are measured by the economic level of the province and the size 
of the provincial government. Economic level is measured by the provincial per capita GDP, and 
provincial government size is measured by provincial total fiscal expenditure relative to provincial 
GDP. The rural/urban ratio captures both social and economic characteristics of the province, and is 
measured by the ratio of rural people to urban people in the province. 
 
                                                  
3 It would have been interesting to disentangle the variable of “intergovernmental transfer” further into 
conditional and un-conditional transfer and on this basis create another fiscal decentralization variable. 
Unfortunately, this data was not available.  
4 In addition, TPE includes the expenditure of the prefecture (Diqu), the administrative/governmental 
characteristics of which differ significantly between provinces.  
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3.2 Data 
To construct the two fiscal decentralization indicators, we use county government fiscal 
expenditure, the county government’s own revenue5, and total fiscal expenditure at the province 
level. The source of the county data is Prefecture and County Level Public Finance Statistics 
(Quanguo Di Shi Xian Caizheng Tongji Ziliao). The provincial data is from the Finance Year Book 
of China, and the China Statistical Yearbook. Provincial infant mortality rates have been supplied by 
the Beijing Center Disease Prevention and Control.6 The provincial illiteracy rate for the population 
aged 15 and over is calculated from the China Population Statistics Yearbook. Provincial per capita 
GDP is from the China Compendium of Statistics. The provincial birth rate and the ratio of rural to 
urban people in provinces are also calculated from the China Compendium of Statistics. 
The availability of data limits the implications that can be drawn from our analysis. For 
instance, it would have been very useful to include “health expenditure at county level” as a further 
explanatory factor as well as other variables to proxy for health outcomes than IMR rates. It is to be 
hoped that with the increased interest of the Chinese government in health issues, data quality and 
availability will improve to allow for studies that are not constrained by the existing data limitations.  
 
3.3 Descriptive analysis 
 
This study employs the above defined fiscal decentralization indicators to capture fiscal 
decentralization below the province level in China. We use panel data that cover twenty-six 
provinces for seven years (1995 to 2001) for our quantitative analysis.7 
 
                                                  
5 We include tax refunds in counties’ own revenue because the fiscal characteristics of tax refunds in the 
Chinese sense define them in this way rather than as transfers (see OECD (2006) for details of the fiscal 
system). 
6 The dataset is available from the authors upon request. 
7 Our dataset does not include Tibet, Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai because of their exceptionality. 
County expenditure in Tibet depends greatly on resources from upper tiers of the government. Its vertical 
balance (seven-year average) is 5.7, which means Tibet’s county expenditure is almost six times as much 
as its own revenue. This level is exceptionally high compared with other provinces. Regarding Beijing, 
Tianjin, and Shanghai, their county expenditure ratio (seven-year, three-province average) is 8.3%, which 
is very low compared with other provinces. As they are large province-level municipalities, they might 
differ from other provinces in terms of administration or fiscal treatment. Hence, we exclude these three 
provinces as well as Tibet from our dataset. Since 1997, Chongqing has also been one of the large 
province-level municipalities. Thus, we do not include Chongqing in our data set from 1997 to 2001. 
Before 1997, Chongqing was included in Sichuan province as one of the districts in Sichuan. Thus, our 
dataset for 1995 and 1996 reflects this situation. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Major Variables 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
IMR 182 21.96 9.34 8.99 50.28
VB 182 1.36 0.37 0.77 2.59
RCE 182 0.45 0.08 0.21 0.61
Economic level 182 6031.7 2705.3 1853.0 14655.0
Rural/urban ratio 182 2.44 1.20 0.23 6.24
Birth rate 182 15.29 8.25 7.70 115.00
Illiteracy rate 182 16.75 8.16 5.07 51.45  
 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of our panel dataset. The infant mortality rate (IMR) 
varies across provinces and over the years. The lowest IMR (8.9) is for Zhejiang province in 2001, 
and the highest (50.2) is for Qinghai province in 1996. The lowest is much better than the IMR in 
other Asian countries—for example, the IMR of the Philippines was 30.0 in 2000. However, the 
highest IMR (50.2) is worse than those of other Asian countries—for example, Indonesia’s IMR was 
48.0 in 1995. Socioeconomic characteristics also differ between provinces and over the years. It is 
now well known that significant economic differences exist between provinces in China. In addition, 
our observations indicate that social characteristics, such as education level, differ across provinces 
and over the years. Table1 shows that both VB and RCE differ between provinces. As these are our 
most interesting variables, more details will be reported in the following. 
 
Figure 3 VB and RCE in 2000 
Zhejiang
(3.0) (2.5) (2.0) (1.5) (1.0) (0.5) 0.0 0.5 1.0
Guangdong
Jilin
Shaanxi
Ningxia
Hunan
Inner Mongolia
Xingjiang
Henan
Hainan
Jiangsu
Yunnan
Sichuan
Jiangxi
VB
RCE
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Figure 3 provides the VB and RCE of 26 provinces in 2000. The VB is more than one in 
most of the provinces, which means that counties in most of the provinces depend on 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers to carry out their responsibilities. We confirm that the degree of 
VB varies across provinces. In addition, we do not find any particular trend between the VB and the 
RCE. The ratio of county expenditure covered by intergovernmental transfers is high in some 
provinces; however, the RCE (the relative expenditure importance of counties to province) is not 
necessarily high in the provinces. The province–county fiscal relationship differs between provinces 
in China.8 For instance, Figure 3 shows that Zhejiang has the highest RCE of the provinces, which 
means that its county expenditures are high relative to the total province expenditure; however, 
Zhejiang’s VB is not very high compared with other provinces. The RCE of Guangdong is the lowest 
of the provinces, but Guangdong’s VB is higher than that of Zhejiang. This suggests that counties in 
some provinces may have a relatively high fiscal capacity, whereas other counties may suffer from 
fiscal shortages compared to their responsibilities. 
 
4.  Empirical Analysis 
 
We apply a fixed-effects model for our analysis and, hence, the estimation model is: 
 
itiititit uCy ++++= μγα βX  (4), 
 
where μi is the unit-specific residual: it differs between units (provinces) but it is time invariant. It 
captures the unit-specific characteristics that do not change over time. In our model, the unit-specific 
characteristics can be considered to be provincial geographical characteristics, etc. The fixed-effects 
model is also supported by model tests.9 
To examine the impact of fiscal decentralization below the province level on health 
outcomes, we examine following sets of models that focus on vertical balance and the relative 
expenditure importance of the county, respectively. 
 
                                                  
8  Note that differences in the depth of fiscal decentralization below the province level (the 
province-county relation) do not necessarily relate to the economic level or the geographical patterns of 
the provinces (OECD, 2006). The degree of RCE could reflect differences in the fiscal administrative 
system below the province level. There exists basically three-tier of governments below province: 
province, prefecture, and county. In some provinces, the provincial government is directly linked to the 
county governments, while in others the prefecture governments play an intermediary role between 
province and county. A higher RCE value might measure a difference in the administrative structure 
within a province and not only the depth of fiscal decentralization. 
9 The model is tested by an F-statistical test and the Hausman test, which support the fixed-effects model.  
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Models (a–b) ),,,,( EduFerRuralEconVBfIMR =  (5), 
 
where IMR is the provincial infant mortality rate, which is our dependent variable (health outcome), 
VB is the aggregate county vertical balance, Econ denotes the economic level of the province 
measured by provincial per capita GDP and Rural denotes the ratio of rural people to urban people in 
the province. Fer denotes the fertility rate, and Edu is the illiteracy rate of the province, which is a 
proxy of the education level. In the first set of models, we focus on the effect of vertical balance on 
health outcomes. Model (b) includes the RCE to control the influence of the relative expenditure 
importance of the county.  
 
Models (c–d) ),,,,( EduFerRuralEconRCEfIMR =  (6), 
 
where RCE denotes aggregate county expenditure to total provincial expenditure. In this set of 
models, we examine the effect of the relative expenditure importance of the county government 
compared with the provincial government on health outcomes. The coefficient of RCE will be 
interpreted as the effect of the relative importance of the county government on IMR clearly in 
model (d) because the influence of the denominator of RCE is controlled by including provincial 
government size as a control variable.  
 
Models (e–f) ),,,,,,( EduFerRuralEconINTRCEVBfIMR =  (7), 
 
where INT denotes the intersection term of VB and RCE. The intersection term of VB and RCE is 
included in model (e) to examine the interaction effect between them on health outcomes. Model (f) 
includes both the intersection term and provincial government size.    
We need to heed the interpretation of models including the intersection term. The 
estimation equations of models (a) and (c) are, respectively: 
 
itiititit uCVBIMR ++++= μγβα )ln()ln( 1  (8), 
itiititit uCRCEIMR ++++= μγβα )ln()ln( 1  (9). 
 
β is interpreted as the elasticity of VB or RCE to the infant mortality rate, which is fixed as β1. 
The estimation equation of models (e) and (f) is: 
 
itiitititititit uCVBRCERCEVBIMR ++++++= μγβββα )ln(*)ln()ln()ln()ln( 321  (10). 
 
In this model, the intersection term allows the elasticity to vary. The elasticity of VB to 
 12
IMR is )ln(*)ln(
ln
31 RCEVB
IMR ββ +=∂∂ . Likewise, the elasticity of RCE to IMR 
is )ln(*)ln(
ln
32 VBRCE
IMR ββ +=∂∂ . Therefore, the elasticity varies depending on the value 
of VB or RCE. 
 
Table 2 Impact of Fiscal Decentralization on Health Outcomes10 
 
      D ependen t variab le
Independen t variab le
(a) V B : V ertica l balance  (ln ) -0 .191 (-2 .20)* -0 .230 (-2 .57)**
(b) R C E : R atio  o f county govt expenditu re  (ln ) -0 .187 (-3 .27)** -0 .161 (-2 .81)** -0 .165 (-2 .69)**
P er cap ita  G D P  (ln ) -0 .221 (-2 .43)* -0 .236 (-2 .59)** -0 .313 (-3 .74)** -0 .163 (-2 .07)*
R ural/u rban  ra tio 0 .016 (0 .74) 0 .008 (0 .38 ) 0 .018 (0 .84) 0 .021 (1 .10)
B irth  ra te 0 .004 (4 .21)** 0 .003 (4 .08 )** 0 .004 (4 .36)** 0 .004 (4 .18)**
Illite racy ra te 0 .009 (4 .49)** 0 .008 (4 .35 )** 0 .009 (4 .38)** 0 .005 (2 .24)*
P rovincial govt s ize -2 .158 (-4 .47)**
N um ber o f observations 182 182 182 182
N um ber o f groups 26 26 26 26
R 2 w ith in 0 .503 0 .522 0 .506 0 .580
      D ependen t variab le
Independen t variab le
(a) V B : V ertica l balance  (ln ) 0 .208 (1 .01) 0 .100 (0 .41 )
(b) R C E : R atio  o f county govt expenditu re  (ln ) -0 .317 (-3 .73)** -0 .229 (-2 .64)**
(c): In tersection  term : (a ) *  (b ) 0 .577 (2 .10)* 0 .242 (0 .77 )
P er cap ita  G D P  (ln ) -0 .226 (-2 .50)** -0 .146 (-1 .69)
R ural/u rban  ra tio 0 .014 (0 .67) 0 .020 (1 .02 )
B irth  ra te 0 .003 (3 .80)** 0 .003 (3 .89 )**
Illite racy ra te 0 .008 (3 .83)** 0 .005 (2 .21 )*
P rovincial govt size -1 .938 (-3 .64)**
N um ber o f observations 182 182
N um ber o f groups 26 26
R 2 w ith in 0 .534 0 .583
(d)
Infan t M ortality  R ate  (ln )
(e) (f)
In fan t M ortality  R ate  (ln )
(a) (b ) (c)
 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, corrected for panel heteroskedasticity.  
The symbol * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
The symbol ** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
                                                  
10 As indicated in Table 2, two fiscal decentralization indicators, the economic level (per capita GDP) and 
the dependent variable, are defined in logs. As explained in the text, the coefficients of the variables can 
be interpreted as elasticity by a log transformation. A log transformation is sometimes applied in order to 
manage heteroskedasticity. Many other studies apply a log transformation (Filmer and Pritchett, 1999; de 
Mello, 2000; Baldacci, Guin-Siu and de Mello, 2003; Jin and Zou, 2005). Filmer and Pritchett (1999) 
discussed in detail the transformation of variables to logs. 
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Table 2 summarizes the main results. First, we examine the effect of VB on health outcomes 
(IMR). Vertical balance captures the importance of intergovernmental fiscal transfers, including 
various kinds of subsidies, to counties, which fill the potential fiscal gaps of the counties. Model (a) 
is the simplest model including VB as measure of fiscal decentralization. The coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant in model (a); that is, when VB increases, IMR decreases. The same result 
is confirmed in model (b), in which RCE is controlled for. This result suggests that 
intergovernmental transfers to county governments are important for attaining better health 
outcomes, after controlling for the influence of the relative expenditure importance of the county 
government. Model (e) includes the intersection term between VB and RCE; however, coefficient of 
VB is not statistically significant in model (e). 
Second, we focus on the effect of RCE on IMR. Is an increase in the relative expenditure 
importance of the county government good for health outcomes? All coefficients of RCE are 
statistically significant. The coefficient of the intersection term is statistically significant in model (e), 
but less significant in model (f). The coefficients of RCE are negative in models (c) and (d), which 
means that IMR is lower in a province where the relative importance of county governments is 
enhanced. We have to consider the intersection term effect in models (e) and (f). The elasticity of 
RCE is )ln(*32 VBββ + , which varies depending on the variable VB. The elasticity of RCE varies 
from –0.47 to 0.23 in model (e) and from –0.29 to 0.00 in model (f). These results suggest important 
points. When we do not consider the interaction effect between RCE and VB, the empirical result 
suggests a simple interpretation of the impact of county importance on health outcomes (IMR). That 
is, when the relative importance of county expenditure responsibility is enhanced, the IMR decreases. 
However, when we consider the interaction effect, the interpretation is not so straightforward. The 
positive effect of an increasing relative importance of the county government on the IMR seems to 
critically hinge upon a low value of the VB meaning that county expenditures are basically financed 
by county’s own revenues. 
Regarding the control variables, the effects on infant mortality rate are as expected. Economic 
development leads to better health outcomes (a lower infant mortality rate). A higher fertility rate or 
a higher illiteracy rate (a lower education level) relates to worse heath outcomes (a higher infant 
mortality rate). A higher rural ratio in a province will lead worse health outcomes. 
To conclude, our empirical work suggests that, first, if the relative importance of the county 
(the ratio of county expenditure to total provincial expenditure) is constant, more fiscal transfers are 
important to attain better health outcomes. In general, county governments tend to face fiscal 
difficulties in carrying out their responsibilities and hence they depend on financial transfers from 
the provincial level to carry out their responsibilities. This result implies that if fiscal 
decentralization is not accompanied by the provision of adequate resources to lower tiers of 
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government, it will prevent the achievement of expected outcomes.11 
Second, increasing the county government relative expenditure responsibility will improve 
health outcomes if this expenditure will be more financed by its own revenue. Broadening the 
relative expenditure responsibility of the county government does not automatically lead to better 
health outcomes. The results depend critically on the county’s own fiscal capacity, i.e. its own fiscal 
resources. This implies that strengthening revenue authority of county government is important to 
attain better health outcomes when county government expenditure responsibility is increased. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Fiscal decentralization, Chinese style, deviates substantially from the classical text-book 
scenario provided in the fiscal federalism theory. This study finds that more decentralized provinces 
perform better with respect to health outcomes if two conditions are met: first, the need to establish a 
functioning transfer system between the province and the county level and secondly to strengthen 
local governments own fiscal capacity. Another, equally important challenge and not addressed in 
this paper is to combine fiscal decentralization with health sector financing reforms in such a way, 
that Out-of-Pockets payments are reduced and access to health care service improves. This is an 
important task for further research. To understand better the factors that could help to improve the 
delivery of health care in China is a crucial determinant in China’s self chosen way towards a 
harmonious society. Currently, many citizens in particular in poor and remote areas are still deprived 
from the access to basic social services.  
Providing incentives for local governments is crucial as local authorities generally may have 
little interest in public services, especially those with interjurisdictional spill-over. Mapping 
resources to expenditure is an important tool for this but not the only one. Setting up a transfer 
system to redistribute funding is important to boost poorer regions’ fiscal capacity. To make this 
function, responsibilities at the various levels of government and health institutions must be clearly 
defined and enforced. To this end, Chinese authorities might want to consider changing the 
accountability of local civil servants from the upper layer of government to the local population 
through effective political devolution of powers. More work is needed how such a change could be 
put into practices, what would be the likely benefits and risks and who would ensure a proper 
implementation.  
 
                                                  
11 This empirical finding is supported by previous studies that equally found that the theoretical benefits 
of decentralization only materialize on the ground when certain conditions are met (Jütting et al., 2005). 
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Appendix 
Table 1A Variable and Description 
 
Indicator Description
Fiscal Decentralization
  Ratio of county govt expenditure (RCE) Ratio of aggregate counties' expenditures to total provincial fiscal expenditure
  Vertical balance (VB) Ratio of aggregat counties' expenditures to aggregate counties' own fical revenues
Control variables
  Economic level Provincial per capita GDP
  Rural/urban ratio Ratio of rural population to urban population in province
  Birth rate (Fertility rate) Ratio of number of births to the average population in province (times 1000 (%))
  Illiteracy rate (Education level) Ratio of number of illiterate population to total population, aged 15 and over (%)
  Provincial govt size Total Provincial fiscal expenditure relative to provincial GDP
 
 
